Computational aspects of probabilistic assessment of UAS robust autonomy by Perez, Tristan et al.
COMPUTATIONAL ASPECTS OF PROBABILISTIC
ASSESSMENT OF UAS ROBUST AUTONOMY
Tristan Perez∗,∗∗∗, Brendan Williams∗∗, Pierre de Lamberterie∗
∗School of Engineering, The University of Newcastle, Callaghan NSW 2308, AUSTRALIA,
∗∗Boeing Research & Technology Australia, GPO Box 767 QLD-4001, AUSTRALIA,
∗∗∗ CeSOS, Norwegian University of Science and Technology, Trondheim, NORWAY
tristan.perez@newcastle.edu.au; brendan.p.williams@boeing.com;
pierre.delamberterie@uon.edu.au
Keywords: Robust Autonomy, UAS design & certification
Abstract
As the level of autonomy in Unmanned Aircraft
Systems (UAS) increases, there is an imperative
need for developing methods to assess robust au-
tonomy. This paper focuses on the computations
that lead to a set of measures of robust auton-
omy. These measures are the probabilities that
selected performance indices related to the mis-
sion requirements and airframe capabilities re-
main within regions of acceptable performance.
1 Introduction
The large potential for applications of Unmanned
Aircraft Systems (UAS) in civilian operations
and national security is putting an increasing
amount of pressure on National Airworthiness
Authorities (NAAs) to provide a path for certi-
fication and allow UAS integration into the na-
tional airspace [1]. Decisions about certification
must be based on demonstrated levels of varying
degrees of robust autonomy.
In a companion paper [2], the authors de-
scribe a probabilistic framework for performance
evaluation of UAS Robust Autonomy. This
framework is akin to the evaluation that pilots un-
dergo during the licensing process, and the data
from the proposed evaluation can be used as an
aid for decision making in certification and UAS
designs. The outcomes of the performance eval-
uation are a set of measures of robust autonomy.
These measures are the probabilities that per-
formance indices related to the mission require-
ments and airframe capabilities remain within re-
gions of acceptable performance. This paper dis-
cusses the computational aspects of the measures
of robust autonomy.
2 Robust Autonomy of UAS and its Evalua-
tion
Robust autonomy describes the ability of an au-
tonomous system to either continue its operation
in the presence of faults or safely shut down [2].
Robust autonomy encapsulates the reliability of
the UAS physical platform and components plus
the ability of autonomous decision making—to
varying degrees—in relation to guidance, naviga-
tion, communications and control. In a manned
aircraft, the decision making aspect rests entirely
on the pilot, whereas a remotely operated aircraft
the system must have certain degree of autonomy
and the pilot monitors the operation and makes
decisions only the case of an emergency.
It is important to highlight from the outset
that when assessing humans for issuing a pilot
license, we do not expect that each and every
emergency situation will result in a satisfactory
outcome. What is assessed is that the actions
of the candidate pilot conform to accepted "best
practices" and that the actions position the air-
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craft in a manner that maximises the likelihood
of a satisfactory outcome over an envelope of
scenarios that simulate potential emergency sit-
uations. When assessing autonomy of UAS, we
need to keep this in mind as the assessment can-
not guarantee a positive outcome for each and ev-
ery emergency scenario. The above suggest that
the assessment of robust autonomy, as well as the
assessment of pilots, involves making decisions
under uncertainty. This calls for a probabilistic
framework, which is the approach proposed in
[2, 3, 4].
The performance of a UAS system can be
assessed in essentially the same way as pilots
are assessed. Within this framework the pi-
lot being tested is replaced by proprietary hard-
ware, and associated software, that implements
the functions of decision making in relation to
guidance, navigation, communications and con-
trol (GNCC). These functions can include fault
detection & diagnosis and reconfiguration of the
GNCC systems to accommodate faults and pre-
vent system failure. The GNCC hardware is con-
nected to a hardware-in-the-loop (HIL) simula-
tion environment which can simulate different as-
pects of the mission under various environmen-
tal conditions and fault scenarios (sensors, actua-
tors, UAS platform aerodynamics, other aircraft,
etc.) The data collected from these HIL simula-
tions can then be used to assess performance and
therefore decision making about certification and
system design. This process is illustrated in Fig-
ure 1.
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Fig. 1 Evaluation of Robust Autonomy.
2.1 Performance Criteria and Environment
UAS are specifically designed for particular
missions and environments under which the
missions need to be conducted. The measures of
performance discussed in the previous section
can be evaluated in terms of specific perfor-
mance indices related to mission requirements
and airframe capabilities. For example Table 1
shows some of the performance indices that
can be adopted according to the measures of
performance related to Aviate, Navigate, and
Communicate.
Table 1 Example of performance indices for UAS
Missions.
Index Description
r1 Climbing rate
r2 Bank angle
r3 Loading factor
r4 Angle of attack
r5 Sideslip angle
r6 Air speed
r7 Sense & avoid
r8 Ability to land
r9 Kinetic energy in emergency landing
r10 Required location
r11 Remain outside of a no-fly zone
For each index ri (i = 1,2, . . . , l) we can as-
sociate set Ri, such that satisfactory performance
is attained whenever the value of the index is in
the set Ri for the complete mission.
The mission is to be performed under an
envelope of operational conditions that encom-
passes environmental conditions and faults. The
environmental conditions Wj ( j = 1,2, . . . ,m)
refer to weather such as wind velocity and
turbulence. The uncertainty as to which environ-
mental condition can occur during the mission
is described by the probability P(Wj|I), where I
represents background information. These prob-
abilities can be estimated from meteorological
data for a particular geographical location and
2
Computational Aspects of Probabilistic Assessment of UAS Robust Autonomy
time of the year. Note that the weather conditions
to be considered for the operation of the UAS
may depend on the type mission. For example, a
UAS used for bush fire monitoring is expected to
operate in high speed and highly turbulent winds,
whereas a UAS used for aerial photography is
expected to operate in light wind conditions.
The UAS platform may also be subjected to
faults Fk (k = 0,1, . . . ,n), which can be asso-
ciates with actuators, sensors, communication
link, changes in aerodynamics, and the presence
of other aircraft. The fault F0 denotes the
faultless or healthy case. The uncertainty as to
which fault may occur during the mission is
described by the probability P(Fk|I), where I
represents background information. If the fault
is associated with a component or a subsystem,
for example a servo of a control surface, then
P(Fk|I) is can be taken as the reliability of the
component or subsystem. That is P(Fk|I) is the
probability that the fault Fk will occur during the
mission given that the fault has not occurred at
the time of starting the mission. This probability
is standard measure in reliability, and it can be
computed from the failure rate function of the
component or system [5].
2.2 Evaluating Performance
For each performance index, we can define the
event of satisfactory performance as that in which
a performance index remains inside its region of
satisfactory performance for the complete mis-
sion:
Si ≡ {ri ∈ Ri}. (1)
Note, that Si is an event that can be either true or
false after a mission is evaluated.
The evaluation of the performance during the
mission can be assessed in terms of the predicted
probabilities of satisfactory performance of each
index in one mission given what we have learned
from the data D related to the evaluation of the
system. These probabilities can be computed
by magninalising over the operational conditions
(weather and faults):
P(Si|D, I) =∑
j
∑
k
P(Si,Wj,Fk|D, I) (2)
=∑
j
∑
k
P(Si|Wj,Fk,D)P(Wj|I)P(Fk|I).
These probabilities are called Measures of Robust
Autonomy [2]. Each of these measures involves
different aspects of the system which contribute
to its reliability:
• P(Wj|I) and P(Fk|I) capture uncertainty
about the operational conditions of the sys-
tem. P(Wj|I),( j = 1 : m) define the en-
velope of environmental conditions and
P(Fk|I),(k= 1 : n) capture the reliability of
the platform component and subsystems.
Note that we are assuming that Wj and
Fk are conditionally independent, namely,
P(Wj,Fk|I) = P(Wj|I)P(Fk|I).
• P(Si|Wj,Fk,D, I),(i = 1 : l) evaluates the
quality of autonomous decision making
in the GNCC systems of the UAS. This
encompasses aspects of robustness and
performance of the flight control system,
fault detection and diagnosis system, and
on-line decisions about reconfiguration of
the flight control system and mission re-
routing and trajectory planning.
The probabilities P(Si|Wj,Fk,D, I) are related to
the concept of coverage discussed in [6], that
is, the probability of keeping a desired level
of performance given that a particular scenario
(weather and fault) has occurred. In the context
of this paper, coverage encompasses not only the
low-level motion flight controller but, depending
on the degree of autonomy of the platform, also
the guidance and sense and avoid system.
The probabilities P(Si|D, I) in (2) are the
predicting probabilities of success of the per-
formance index remaining in their region of
acceptable performance in one mission. This
can be generalised to a cumulative probability of
having at least a certain number of successes in a
number of missions.
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3 Computation of Coverage Probabilities
The evaluation of robust autonomy requires the
computation of coverage probabilities based on
data of experimental testing of GNCC hardware
and software with a hardware-in-the-loop testing
simulations. This computation can be separated
into two parts: inference and prediction.
3.1 Inference
If satisfactory performance is defined in terms of
the values of the performance indices being in-
side a particular range, ri ∈ Ri, the events defined
in (1) are outcomes of Bernoulli trials, that is suc-
cess or failure. Hence, if the system is tested a
number of times N, for each index we have a se-
quence of binary results
Di = {si(1),si(2), . . . ,si(N)}.
The probability of observing these data is given
by the Bernoulli distribution:
p(Di|θ, I jk) = θR(1−θ)N−R, (3)
where R represents the number of successes
within the sequence Di, θ represents the proba-
bility of success, that is P(ri ∈ Ri) in one trial,
and I jk = {Wj,Fk, I} represents the information
related to the particular condition being tested.
To estimate the parameter θ, we can follow a
Bayesian approach and compute the posterior
distribution of θ given the data from the test:
p(θ|Di, I jk) =
p(Di|θ, I jk)p(θ|I jk)∫
p(Di|θ, I jk)p(θ|I jk)dθ . (4)
The prior distribution p(θ|I jk) represents our ini-
tial knowledge about the probability of the per-
formance index being in its region of acceptance.
Since, we may have little knowledge about the
performance of system that is being tested, we
can chose a uniform prior:
p(θ|I jk) = 1, 0≤ θ≤ 1. (5)
With this prior, and the sampling distribution (3),
the posterior (4) can be determined analytically
[7]:
p(θ|Di, I jk) = (N+1)!R!(N−R)!θ
R(1−θ)N−R. (6)
3.2 Prediction
Having computed the posterior of the probabil-
ity of success of a particular index, the question
that arises is what is the actual probability of ob-
taining a certain number of successes in a certain
number of future missions? If we knew the true
success probability θ, then the probability of hav-
ing Z successes in M missions is given by the Bi-
nomial distribution:
p(Z|θ) =
(
M
Z
)
θZ(1−θ)M−Z. (7)
In practice we only know the posterior (6) and not
the actual value of θ. So the predicted probability
of Z given the data Di can be computed from
p(Z|Di, I jk) =
∫ 1
0
p(Z|θ)p(θ|Di, I jk)dθ. (8)
By doing this integration, we average the uncer-
tainty about θ.
The coverage probabilities in (2), are the pre-
dicted probabilities of one success in the next
mission. These can be computed by taking Z=1
and M=1 in (7), in which case (8) reduces to
p(Si|Di,Wk,Fk, I) =
∫ 1
0
θp(θ|Di, I jk)dθ, (9)
=
R+1
N+2
.
From the sampling distribution (6), the coverage
reduces to
p(Si|Di,Wk,Fk, I) = R+1N+2 .
4 A Single Figure of Merit
In some cases, it may be convenient to have a
single figure of merit for robust autonomy. The
natural procedure to obtain this figure would be
to evaluate the probability that all the indices are
jointly within their regions of acceptable perfor-
mance, namely,
P(S1, . . . ,Sl|D, I)
=∑
j
∑
k
P(S1, . . . ,Sl,Wj,Fk|D, I)
=∑
j
∑
k
P(S1, . . . ,Sl|Wj,Fk,D)P(Wj|I)P(Fk|I).
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5 Example of Computations
In this section, we consider an example, of a test
in simulation, of an autopilot part of a remotely
piloted aircraft system with a capability for con-
trol surface fault detection and control reconfig-
uration [9]. The UAS has a mass of 28Kg and
is to be considered for surf-condition monitoring
at 1km off the coastline. This aircraft has four
control surfaces, ailerons and split elevators, to
create redundancy to servo failures via control al-
location.
We consider the part of the mission related to
approaching a recovery location (before the land-
ing phase). The desired trajectory is shown in
Figure 2. The assumed weather conditions are
given by a mean wind speed and turbulence spec-
trum [10], and faults in the four control surface
servos are also considered. The operational con-
ditions for testing and their associated marginal
probabilities are summarised in the following:
F0: Healthy; P(F0|I) = 0.7619.
F1: Right aileron; P(F1|I) = 0.0794.
F2: Left aileron; P(F2|I) = 0.0794.
F3: Right elevator; P(F3|I) = 0.0397.
F4: Left elevator; P(F4|I) = 0.0397.
W1: Wind 0 knots; P(W1|I) = 0.0909.
W2: Wind 10 knots; P(W2|I) = 0.6364.
W3: Wind 20 knots; P(W3|I) = 0.2727.
To evaluate performance we consider the indices
shown in Table 2. The time at which the faults
occur is assumed to be uniformly distributed over
the length of the mission.
The evaluations of the coverage probabili-
ties P(Si|Wj,Fk,D, I), are summarised in Table 3.
Each probability is computed using (9) and data
of 100 simulation scenarios. Figure 3, for ex-
ample shows the outcomes of the simulation for
the index related to the bank angle for the case
of wind of 10kts and no fault; that is predicted
coverage P(S1|W2,F0,D, I) = 0.9820 in Table 3.
Table 2 Performance indices and limits for the
tested mission.
Index Description Limits
r1 Bank angle ±60deg
r2 Loading factor ±3.5
r3 Angle of attack ±11.5deg
r4 Air speed < 30m/s
r5 Horiz Pos Error ±5m
r6 Vert Pos Error ±5m
Figure 3 also shows the posterior p(θ|D1, I10),
where I10 = {W1,F0, I}, computed using (6). Fig-
ure 4 shows the outcomes and posterior for the
case bank angle for the case of wind of 10kts and
fault in the right aileron, that is predicted cover-
age P(S1|W2,F1,D, I) = 0.9310 in Table 3.
Using the probabilities in Table 3 into (2), we
obtain the following measures of robust auton-
omy:
• P(S1|D, I) = 0.9737 (Bank angle)
• P(S2|D, I) = 0.9737 (Loading factor)
• P(S3|D, I) = 0.9806 (Angle of attack)
• P(S4|D, I) = 0.9820 (Air speed)
• P(S5|D, I) = 0.7600 (Horiz Pos Error)
• P(S6|D, I) = 0.8208 (Vert Pos Error)
As we can see from these figures, the perfor-
mance of fault-tolerant autopilot is satisfactory
for most performance indices except for the lo-
cation relative to the desired trajectory, which for
this part of the mission has stringent tolerances as
specified in Table 2.
To assess what the main limiting issues may
be, we can analyse the coverage probabilities
shown in Table 3. Figure 5 shows a graphical
display of these probabilities. These data indi-
cate that the system handles very well the vari-
ous faults and environmental conditions for the
first four performance indices (bank angle, load-
ing, factor, AoA, and air speed) with a probability
above 0.9 of being inside the region of acceptable
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performance. The location indices struggle un-
der faults and the degradation of performance is
increases with the severity of the weather. For a
discussion on how this data can be used for certi-
fication and also to improve initial system see our
companion paper [2].
Table 3 Coverage Probabilities P(Si|Wj,Fk,D)
S1 F0 F1 F2 F3 F4
W1 0.9820 0.9410 0.8920 0.9820 0.9820
W2 0.9820 0.9310 0.9310 0.9820 0.9820
W3 0.9820 0.9410 0.9410 0.9590 0.9680
S2 F0 F1 F2 F3 F4
W1 0.9820 0.9410 0.8920 0.9820 0.9820
W2 0.9820 0.9310 0.9310 0.9820 0.98202
W3 0.9820 0.9410 0.9410 0.9590 0.9680
S3 F0 F1 F2 F3 F4
W1 0.9820 0.9500 0.9216 0.9820 0.9820
W2 0.9820 0.9820 0.9680 0.9820 0.9820
W3 0.9820 0.9820 0.9820 0.9820 0.9820
S4 F0 F1 F2 F3 F4
W1 0.9820 0.9820 0.9820 0.9820 0.9820
W2 0.9820 0.9820 0.9820 0.9820 0.9820
W3 0.9820 0.9820 0.9820 0.9820 0.9820
S5 F0 F1 F2 F3 F4
W1 0.9820 0.9750 0.9750 0.9820 0.9820
W2 0.8450 0.8030 0.7940 0.7050 0.7840
W3 0.6820 0.0180 0.0180 0.0180 0.0180
S6 F0 F1 F2 F3 F4
W1 0.9820 0.9750 0.9750 0.9820 0.9820
W2 0.8450 0.8030 0.7940 0.7050 0.7840
W3 0.7820 0.7180 0.6180 0.6180 0.5180
5.1 Simulation Scenarios and Quality of the
Estimates
A point estimate of θ (the probability of a suc-
cess of a performance index in a mission) can be
taken as the value of θ at which the posterior (6)
is maximum θMAP (maximum a posteriori). By
taking the logarithm of the posterior
L= log p(θ|Di, I jk), (10)
and using a second-order Taylor expansion, it
is shown in [8], that the 95% confidence in-
terval of that covers the true value is given by
[θMAP−2σ,θMAP+2σ], where
σ=
(
d2L
dθ2
∣∣∣∣
θMAP
)−1/2
=
√
θMAP(1−θMAP)
N
. (11)
As discussed [8], the value of θMAP does not
change very much after a moderate amount of
data is used. The maximum of the numerator in
(11) is attained for θMAP =0.5. This indicates that
it requires more data to estimate the parameter θ
for a system with medium performance (θMAP ≈
0.5) than for a system with either very good per-
formance (θMAP ≈1) or very bad performance
(θMAP ≈ 0). In the example of the previous sec-
tion, we used 100 scenarios, which means that for
the worst case, the true value of θ will be in the
interval θMAP±0.1.
The number of simulations required to
achieve a desired quality level in the estimates
can required quite a few hours of hardware-in-the
loop simulation. This can be alleviated by test-
ing in parallel different sections common to many
missions. This may require, for example, to con-
sider different weather conditions and faults for
• take off,
• climbing to mission altitude,
• manoeuvring at altitude,
• sense and avoid,
• approach to recovery,
• landing.
6 Conclusions
This paper refines a previously proposed frame-
work for a probabilistic assessment of various de-
grees of robust autonomy in UAS. The proba-
bilistic assessment takes into account uncertainty
in the weather conditions and fault scenarios un-
der which the UAS autonomous decision making
must operate. Data collected from testing, po-
tentially using hardware-in-the-loop simulations
provides information about coverage, namely, the
probability that the system will keep adequate
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levels of performance given a particular weather
and fault conditions. The coverage probabilities
are then used to compute measures of robust au-
tonomy, which are selected according to the re-
quirements of the mission and airframe capabil-
ities. These measures are probabilities of satis-
factory performance given what has been learned
through the system evaluation. The evaluation
of performance is done without specific knowl-
edge of the implementation of autonomous deci-
sion making.
The proposed framework provides the prob-
abilities that are the basis necessary for decision
making by the NAAs. If an NAA adopts the pro-
posed framework, then regulations for certifica-
tion of classes of missions should detailed the re-
quired levels or reliability of robust autonomy re-
quired.
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Fig. 2 Desired trajectory for approaching a recovery location.
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Fig. 3 Simulation outcomes and posterior for bank angle with a wind of 10kts and no fault.
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Fig. 4 Simulation outcomes and posterior for bank angle with a wind of 10kts and a fault in the right aileron.
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